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A CASE FOR INCREASED CONFIDENTIALITY
Abraham Abramovsky*
I. Introduction
The sixth amendment right to counsel' is a cornerstone of the
American legal system. 2 This right entitles the defendant in a criminal
case to competent and effective assistance of counsel.3 To provide
effective representation, an attorney must be fully informed of all
relevant facts, including client indiscretions and crimes committed
or contemplated by his client. Any restrictions on this free exchange
between client and attorney substantially interfere with both effective
representation and the privilege of confidentiality. 4
* Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. B.A., City University
of New York (Queens); J.D., State University of New York (Buffalo); LL.M.,
J.S.D., Columbia University.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The sixth amendment states: "In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to ... have the assistance of counsel
for his defence [sic]." Id.
2. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 409 (1977) (Marshall, J., concurring)
(every American entitled to protective shield of a lawyer between himself and
awesome power of State).
3. Strickland v. Washington, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984); McMann v. Rich-
ardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970); United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197, 1201
(D.C. Cir. 1973).
4. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 4-1 (1981) [hereinafter
cited as CODE]. Ethical Consideration (EC) 4-1 provides:
Both the fiduciary relationship existing between lawyer and client and
the proper functioning of the legal system require the preservation by
the lawyer of confidences and secrets of one who has employed or sought
to employ him. A client must feel free to discuss whatever he wishes
with his lawyer and a lawyer must be equally free to obtain information
beyond that volunteered by his client. A lawyer should be fully informed
of all the facts of the matter he is handling in order for his client to
obtain the full advantage of our legal system. It is for the lawyer in
the exercise of his independent professional judgment to separate the
relevant and important from the irrelevant and unimportant. The ob-
servance of the ethical obligation of a lawyer to hold inviolate the
confidences and secrets of his client not only facilitates the full devel-
opment of facts essential to proper representation of the client but also
encourages laymen to seek early legal assistance.
Id. Lawyer conduct in the United States was originally governed by the Canons
of Professional Ethics (Canons), which were adopted by the American Bar As-
sociation (ABA) in 1908. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances,
Formal Ops. Foreword, at ix (1947). In 1969, a Model Code of Professional
Responsibility (Code) was drafted and adopted by the ABA. ABA/BNA LAW.
MANUAL ON PROF. CONDUCT (BNA) 1:301 (1984) [hereinafter cited as LAWYERS'
MANUAL]. In August, 1983, the ABA House of Delegates adopted the Model Rules
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XIII
Unless an attorney is well informed, it is impossible for him to
meet his ethical obligation to represent clients zealously and effec-
tively.5 A trial attorney needs facts to draw up motion papers,
of Professional Conduct (Rules), which replaced the entire Code. LAWYERS' MANUAL,
supra, at 1:101 and 1:301.
5. See CODE, supra note 4, DR 7-101, DR 7-102. Disciplinary Rule
(DR) 7-101, entitled "Representing a Client Zealously," provides:
(A) A lawyer shall not intentionally:
(1) Fail to seek the lawful objectives of his client through reasonably
available means permitted by law and the Disciplinary Rules, except as
provided by DR 7-101(B). A lawyer does not violate this Disciplinary
Rule, however, by acceding to reasonable requests of opposing counsel
which do not prejudice the rights of his client, by being punctual in
fulfilling all professional commitments, by avoiding offensive tactics, or
by treating with courtesy and consideration all persons involved in the
legal process.
(2) Fail to carry out a contract of employment entered into with a client
for professional services, but he may withdraw as permitted under DR
.2-110, DR 5-102, and DR 5-105.
(3) Prejudice or damage his client during the course of the professional
relationship, except as required under DR 7-102(B).
(B) In his representation of a client, a lawyer may:
(1) Where permissible, exercise his professional judgment to waive or
fail to assert a right or position of his client.
(2) Refuse to aid or participate in conduct that he believes to be unlawful,
even though there is some support for an argument that the conduct is
legal.
CODE, supra note 4, DR 7-101.
DR 7-102, entitled "Representing a Client Within the Bounds of the Law,"
provides:
(A) In his representation of a client, a lawyer shall not:
(1) File a suit, assert a position, conduct a defense, delay a trial, or
take other action on behalf of his client when he knows or when it is
obvious that such action would serve merely to harass or maliciously
injure another.
(2) Knowingly advance a claim or defense that is unwarranted under
existing law, except that he may advance such claim or defense if it can
be supported by good faith argument for an extension, modification, or
reversal of existing law.
(3) Conceal or knowingly fail to disclose that which he is required by
law to reveal.
(4) Knowingly use perjured testimony or false evidence.
(5) Knowingly make a false statement of law or fact.
(6) Participate in the creation or preservation of evidence when he knows
or it is obvious that the evidence is false.
(7) Counsel or assist his client in conduct that the lawyer knows to be
illegal or fraudulent.
(8) Knowingly engage in other illegal conduct or conduct contrary to a
Disciplinary Rule.
(B) A lawyer who receives information clearly establishing that:
(1) His client has, in the course of the representation, perpetrated a
fraud upon a person or tribunal shall promptly call upon his client to
rectify the same, and if his client refuses or is unable to do so, he shall
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affidavits and memoranda. Such documents should not be the prod-
uct of conjecture. 6 Often, necessary facts can be provided only by
the client, and he must feel free to provide them. Similarly, to
conduct a meaningful cross-examination the attorney must be fully
apprised of the facts of the case. Finally, to develop an appropriate
trial strategy and to determine which defenses to raise, which wit-
nesses to call, or whether to have the defendant testify, the lawyer
must be fully informed. 7
The same is true outside of the criminal field. To properly evaluate
a situation, an attorney advising a corporate client must know all
relevant data. Both the common law and modern statutes emphasize
that there must be a free flow of information between attorney and
client.8
As explained in the Ethical Considerations of the Model Code of
Professional Responsibility (Code):
Both the fiduciary relationship existing between lawyer and client
and the proper functioning of the legal system require the pres-
ervation by the lawyer of confidences and secrets of one who
has employed or sought to employ him. A client must feel free
to discuss whatever he wishes with his lawyer and a lawyer must
be equally free to obtain information beyond that volunteered by
his client. A lawyer should be fully informed of all the facts of
the matter he is handling in order for his client to obtain the
full advantage of our legal system. It is for the lawyer in the
reveal the fraud to the affected person or tribunal, except when the
information is protected as a privileged communication.
(2) A person other than his client has perpetrated a fraud upon a tribunal
shall promptly reveal the fraud to the tribunal.
CODE, supra note 4, DR 7-102.
In People v. Beige, 83 Misc. 2d 186, 372 N.Y.S.2d 798, aff'd, 50 A.D.2d 1088,
376 N.Y.S.2d 771 (4th Dep't 1975), aff'd, 41 N.Y.2d 60, 359 N.E.2d 377, 390
N.Y.S.2d 867 (1976), the lower court stated: "The effectiveness of counsel is only
as great as the confidentiality of its client-attorney relationship. If the lawyer cannot
get all the facts about the case, he can only give his client half of a defense."
83 Misc. 2d at 189, 372 N.Y.S.2d at 801.
6. E.g., N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 710.60(1) (McKinney 1971).
7. 1 ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIM. JUST. ch. 4, at 33 & 55 (2d ed. 1980)
[hereinafter cited as ABA STANDARDS].
8. See, e.g., ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 150 (1936)
(common law origin of rule); id. Op. 247 (1942) (principle recognized in Ohio
statute).
Professor Drinker, in his legal ethics treatise, stated:
The rule . . . that confidential communications by or on behalf of a
client may not be disclosed without his consent, has long been a rule
of the common law, and is in many jurisdictions the subject of statute.
As such, its application is usually a question of law rather than of ethics.
H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 132 (1953).
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exercise of his independent professional judgment to separate the
relevant and important from the irrelevant and unimportant. The
observance of the ethical obligation of a lawyer to hold inviolate
the confidences and secrets of his client not only facilitates the
full development of facts essential to proper representation of the
client but also encourages laymen to seek early legal assistance. 9
Thus, the Code implies that no consideration is more important
than the duty of confidentiality. The Code's emphasis on confi-
dentiality has been carried forward in the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct (Rules).10 In particular, Rule 1.6 reinforces the notion that
client confidentiality should be a paramount consideration for the
attorney, even if he becomes aware that his client is committing or
intends to commit a crime."
Dilemmas over client confidentiality may arise in a number of
ways; for instance, when:
(1) the client reveals his own past, ongoing, or intended future
criminal conduct to his attorney;' 2
(2) the client turns over fruits or instrumentalities of such a crime
to his attorney;' 3
(3) the client perjures himself;' 4
(4) the client's criminal record becomes an issue at his sentencing
hearing;' or
9. CODE, supra note 4, EC 4-1.
10. See supra note 4.
11. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1983) [hereinafter cited
as RULES]. Rule 1.6, entitled "Confidentiality of Information," states:
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of
a client unless the client consents after consultation, except for disclosures
that are impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation,
and except as stated in paragraph (b).
(b) A lawyer may reveal such information to the extent the lawyer
reasonably believes necessary:
(1) to prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the lawyer
believes is likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm;
or
(2) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy
between the lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to a criminal
charge or civil claim against the lawyer based upon conduct in which
the client was involved, or to respond to allegations in any proceeding
concerning the lawyer's representation of the client.
Id.
12. See infra Section II.
13. See infra Section III.
14. See infra Section IV.
15. See infra Section V.
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(5) the client becomes a fugitive from justice and his attorney is
aware of his whereabouts.' 6
To illustrate the nature of the duty of confidentiality, this Article
will set forth a series of hypotheticals. 7 The ethical dilemmas pre-
sented by each of these fact situations will then be analyzed. This
Article posits that, in order to promote trust between attorneys and
clients, the attorney should be permitted to guard his client's secrets
in all circumstances and that the duty of confidentiality should
remain paramount although the attorney conduct appropriate to the
circumstances may differ. This Article concludes that the privilege
of confidentiality should allow the attorney who comes into pos-
session of fruits or instrumentalities of a crime to prevent their
disclosure to prosecuting authorities, by submitting them instead to
the administrative judge.' 8
I1. Maintaining the Confidentiality of Client Criminal Conduct
A. A Hypothetical Case
Defense counsel meets with a potential client who discloses that
he has been in a serious fight with another person who is presently
in a coma as a result of that confrontation. During the course
of the consultation, the client reveals that he used a marble
statuette to beat the victim about the head and face. The client
further states that the police will never locate the statuette, since
he has hidden it in a safety deposit box under a false name. The
attorney then advises the client about the difference between assault
and homicide and the available defenses. As the client is preparing
to leave the office, he turns to the attorney and says that he is
certain that he will never need the attorney's services and will
never face criminal charges since only the victim knows who his
assailant was, and the victim will never live to identify him to
the authorities. After making this oblique threat, the client winks
at the lawyer and departs.
This scenario presents the attorney with three ethical dilemmas.
First, the client has admitted committing a past crime-the assault.
Second, the client is committing the continuing crime of obstruction
16. See infra Section V1.
17. Unless otherwise noted, the hypothetical situations posited in this Article
were devised by the author for illustrative purposes and such facts have not arisen
in real cases to date.
18. See infra notes 71-110 and accompanying text.
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of justice by concealing evidence of his crime. Third, the client has
intimated that in the future he may commit the crime of murder
to prevent the victim from identifying him to the authorities. Each
of these confidences presents a different set of ethical considerations
for the lawyer and will be discussed individually.
B. Past Crimes
Only in the rarest of circumstances is there a duty to disclose a
client's past crimes.1 9 On its face, Disciplinary Rule 4-101 does not
permit an attorney to disclose a client's past crime unless the client
has authorized him to do so,20 he is required by law or court order
to do so,2" or he must use the information to defend himself against
accusations of wrongful conduct.22 This proscription against disclo-
sure requires an attorney to maintain the secrecy of any facts relating
to the crime, such as the location of a corpse.
In People v. Beige,23 the court dismissed criminal charges against
an attorney who failed to report to the authorities the location of a
19. Under DR 7-102, where the crime already committed involves fraud, the
attorney is under a duty to rectify that fraud. See New Jersey State Bar Ass'n
Advisory Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 520 (1983) (must reveal that client
filed false financial information with court in divorce action); New York County
Lawyers' Ass'n, Comm. on Professional Ethics, Question No. 574 (1969) (filing
false VISA application must be reported while application still pending); New York
State Bar Ass'n, Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 358 (1936) (must reveal filing
of false bankruptcy petition); see also infra notes 111-79 and accompanying text.
However, nearly every ethics opinion which has addressed this issue has held that
an attorney has no ethical duty to disclose a client's past crimes. See, e.g., ABA
Comm. on Professional Ethics, Informal Op. 778 (1964) (misappropriation of funds);
id. Op. 287 (1953) (perjury); id. Op. 268 (1945) (filing fraudulent divorce petition);
State Bar of Arizona, Comm. on Rules of Professional Conduct, Op. 183A (1966)
(bigamy); Los Angeles County Bar Ass'n, Comm. on Legal Ethics, Op. 386 (1980)
(perjury); id. Op. 271 (1962) (judgment obtained against innocent party in paternity
suit); id. Op. 267 (1960) (misappropriation of funds); New York State Bar Ass'n,
Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 405 (37-75) (1975) (petit larceny); New York
County Lawyers' Ass'n, Comm. on Professional Ethics, Question No. 560 (1968)
(welfare fraud); cf. Maryland State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Ethics, Op. 84-43 (1983)
(attorney must disclose fact that client committed perjury during deposition).
20. CODE, supra note 4, DR 4-101(C)(I), which provides: "A lawyer may reveal:
[c]onfidences or secrets with the consent of the client or clients affected, but only
after a full disclosure to them."
21. Id. DR 4-101(C)(2) ("A lawyer may reveal: (2) [c]onfidences or secrets when
permitted under Disciplinary Rules or required by law or court order.").
22. Id. DR 4-101(C)(4) ("A lawyer may reveal: (4) [c]onfidences or secrets
necessary to establish or collect his fee or to defend himself or his employees or
associates against an accusation of wrongful conduct.").
23. 83 Misc. 2d 186, 372 N.Y.S.2d 798 (County Court, Onondaga Co. 1974),
aff'd, 50 A.D.2d 1088, 376 N.Y.S.2d 771 (4th Dep't 1975), aff'd, 41 N.Y.2d 60,
359 N.E.2d 370, 390 N.Y.S.2d 867 (1976).
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corpse after his client had informed him of its whereabouts, and he
had visited the area and confirmed his client's account.2 4 The court
concluded that, under the fifth amendment, 5 Belge was constitu-
tionally exempt from any statutory duty to report the location of
the body. 26
C. Continuing Crimes
In the above hypothetical, 27 it is important to note that although
the client informed the attorney that he used the statuette to commit
a crime, he did not deliver the instrumentality of the crime to the
attorney. He has merely told the attorney of its existence and
described its hiding place.28 Thus, this communication ostensibly is
protected as a client confidence.2 9 However, there is also evidence
of the continuing crime of obstruction of justice since the client is
concealing evidence of a past crime.30 When a continuing crime is
involved, the communication no longer is classified as a confidence,
and' the protections of the attorney-client privilege do not apply.3
However, an attorney is ethically obligated to maintain client secrets
as well as client confidences.32 It appears that information about
the statuette would qualify as a client secret within the meaning of
the Code.33 Thus, the duty to keep the client's secrets may apply
to this hybrid of past, present and future crimes.
Although there is a split among authorities, the prevalent and
24. 83 Misc. 2d at 187, 372 N.Y.S.2d at 799.
25. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The fifth amendment states: "[nlo person shall be
• . . compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.....
26. Beige, 83 Misc. 2d at 190, 372 N.Y.S.2d at 803.
27. See supra Section II.A.
28. See infra notes 71-110 for a discussion of issues that arise when a client
delivers fruits or instrumentalities of a crime to his attorney.
29. CODE, supra note 4, DR 4-101(A), which distinguishes between confidences
and secrets as follows: " 'Confidence' refers to information protected by the
attorney-client privilege under applicable law, and 'secret' refers to other information
gained in the professional relationship that the client has requested be held inviolate
or the disclosure of which would be embarrassing or would be likely to be detrimental
to the client." Id. Generally, the attorney-client privilege is limited to confidential
communications between the lawyer and the client made for the purpose of securing
legal advice, not for the purpose of committing a crime. In re Grand Jury Pro-
ceedings, 689 F.2d 1351, 1352 (11th Cir. 1982). For a fuller discussion of the
distinction between confidences and secrets in the context of delivery of the in-
strumentality of a crime, see infra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
31. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 689 F.2d at 1352.
32. CODE, supra note 4, DR 4-101.
33. See id. The disclosure of such information would probably be embarrassing
or detrimental to the client.
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better view is that an attorney may not reveal this continuing crime
to the authorities.3 4 The primary rationale for this conclusion is that
disclosure of the continuing crime would necessitate disclosure of
the past crime, which is prohibited by the Code.35
An unpublished decision of the Supreme Judicial Court of Mas-
sachusetts illustrates the need for such a policy.3 6 A client, Kenneth
Krohn, retained James Pool as counsel to defend him on kidnapping
charges. 7 Krohn informed Pool of the existence and location of two
safe deposit boxes which had been rented under false names. One
of the boxes contained cash, a handgun and false identification.
The keys to the boxes, however, were in the possession of the United
States Attorney.
Unbeknownst to Krohn, Pool approached the United States At-
torney and offered to disclose the whereabouts of the safe deposit
boxes and the false name under which they were rented.3" Pool and
the United States Attorney agreed that Pool could remove any money
from the boxes, but that if the prosecution sought a warrant to
search the boxes the source of information about the boxes would
not be revealed.3 9 After Pool had removed $48,000 from the boxes,
the United States Attorney obtained a warrant and inventoried the
boxes. 4° Although Krohn was informed that the United States At-
torney had located the boxes, he was not told of his attorney's role
in the affair for two years. 41
In 1984, eleven years after he was retained by Krohn, Pool was
disbarred for his violation of the Code of Ethics. 42 When interviewed,
34. See Callan & David, Professional Responsibility and the Duty of Confi-
dentiality: Disclosure of Client Misconduct In An Adversary System, 29 RUTGERS
L. REV. 332, 362-65 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Callan & David]. Examples of the
majority view include New York State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Professional Ethics,
Op. 405 (1975), discussed infra at note 44, and Los Angeles County Bar Ass'n,
Comm. on Legal Ethics, Op. 267 (1960). Also see infra notes 189-230 and ac-
companying text, which discuss fugitive clients and whether there is a duty to keep
their whereabouts confidential.
35. See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text; Callan & David, supra note
34, at 363.
36. In re James M. Pool, No. 83-37BD (Mass. Jan. 17, 1984).
37. Kennedy, Violation of Client Confidence Leads to Disbarment, Nat'l L.J.,
Feb. 13, 1984, at 5, col. 1.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
1985] INCREASED CONFIDENTIALITY
Krohn stated that there was no proof that the contents of the boxes
had enhanced the government's case against him, but clearly the
items had "whetted the government's appetite. ' 43 The lesson of the
Krohn case is that an attorney may not reveal his client's ongoing
criminal activity. 4
This conclusion is mandated by the fifth amendment. 45 When the
client imparts incriminating information in confidence to his attorney,
the attorney should not be permitted to violate that trust by in-
criminating the client. A contrary rule would vitiate the defendant's
fifth amendment rights. 46
Furthermore, as Professor Monroe Freedman has asserted, a lawyer
who possesses all of the relevant facts, including his client's intention
to continue committing an ongoing crime, is in an optimum position
to counsel the client to cease this course of action.47 Both the
individual and society are best served when the attorney dissuades
the client from continuing criminal activity.
D. Future Crimes
The greatest moral, legal and ethical dilemma for an attorney is
posed when the client intimates or even declares to the attorney that
43. Id.
44. Id. A similar result was reached by the New York State Bar Association
Committee on Professional Ethics. In a case where a client confided to his attorney
that he was concealing the fruits of a larceny, the committee concluded that it
would be improper to disclose this information except with the client's consent.
N.Y. State Bar Ass'n, Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 405 (1975); accord Los
Angeles County Bar Ass'n, Comm. on Legal Ethics, Op. 267 (1960).
45. U.S. CONST. amend. V. For the text of the fifth amendment, see supra
note 25.
46. It is well established that an attorney has an affirmative duty to inform
his client of his rights under the fifth amendment. Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S.
449 (1975). Moreover, an attorney may not be held in contempt of court for
advising his client to exercise his fifth amendment rights. Id. at 465-67.
In order to so advise his client, the attorney must possess all the relevant
information, including the incriminating facts. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 7, ch.
4 at 33, 55.
47. See Panel Discussion, 35 U. MIAMI L. REV. 639 (1981). Professor Freedman
stated:
Bear in mind that one of the reasons that I and the Supreme Court and
others [sic] have emphasized the lawyer-client privilege of confidentiality
is that it puts the lawyer in a position to dissuade the client from an
improper course of conduct. I can tell you from a good deal of experience
and from what I have heard said by other lawyers that not only do
lawyers give a lot of good advice, but it is very often taken.
Id. at 641.
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XIII
he will commit a crime in the future. 48 In the above hypothetical, 49
the client's suggestion that he will murder the only potential adverse
witness is an extreme example, yet it brings to light all of the relevant
considerations.
Since the intended crime is murder, disclosure is permitted though
not mandated under both the Code and the Rules." ° Thus, in the
hypothetical, the attorney has complete discretion to remain silent
or to warn either the intended victim or the authorities. However,
neither the Code nor the Rules provide a standard to govern the
exercise of this discretion.' One suggested standard considers whether
"the integrity of the rule of law [is] at stake." 2 Another standard
determines whether the privilege of confidentiality outweighs the
court's need to search for the truth. 3 Although commentators may
disagree over what the standard should be, it is clear that a standard
should be set.
When a client tells his attorney that he intends to commit a crime,
48. See generally Hazard, How Far May a Lawyer Go In Assisting a Client
In Legally Wrongful Conduct?, 35 U. MIAMI L. REV. 669 (1981); Martin, The
Razor's Edge of Conflicting Duties: The Attorney Who Learns of Evidence Im-
plicating His Client Has Some Difficult Choices to Make, 4 CALIF. LAW. 15 (1984);
Comment, Proposed Model Rule 1.6. Its Effect On a Lawyer's Moral and Ethical
Decisions With Regard to Attorney-Client Confidentiality, 35 BAYLOR L. REV. 561
(1983); Comment, Confidentiality and the Lawyer's Conflicting Duty, 27 How.
L.J. 329 (1984); Moral Lepers? Hired Guns? The Fine Line Between Defending
Rights and Concealing Wrongs, 12 STUDENT LAW. 6 (1983).
49. See supra Section I1.A.
50. See CODE, supra note 4, DR 4-101(C)(3), which provides: "[a] lawyer may
reveal .. . [t]he intention of his client to commit a crime and the information
necessary to prevent the crime," and Rule 1.6 (b)(1) of the Rules, which is quoted
in full supra at note 11.
51. See Callan & David, supra note 34, at 355.
52. In re Callan, 66 N.J. 401, 407, 331 A.2d 612, 615-16 (1975). Callan involved
attorneys who failed to inform the court that their client was making unauthorized
disbursements from a rent strike fund.
Other recommended standards include whether the crime would "corrupt the
process of the courts," ABA STANDARDS, supra note 7, Standard 4-3.7(d) (1979),
and whether the crime is so "serious" that the benefits from its prevention "outweigh
the important policy of protecting client secrets." Los Angeles County Bar Ass'n,
Comm. on Legal Ethics, Op. 264 (1959).
53. In re Kozlov, 79 N.J. 232, 241, 398 A.2d 882, 886 (1979). In Kozlov, the
client revealed to his attorney, Kozlov, information on misconduct of a juror in
a criminal case, on the condition that Kozlov not reveal the source of the information.
Id. at 235, 398 A.2d at 883. Kozlov sought to exercise the attorney-client privilege
to keep the identity of his client a secret. Id. at 238, 398 A.2d at 884. The Supreme
Court of New Jersey set aside the lower court's contempt judgment against Kozlov,
holding that the privilege of confidentiality outweighed the court's interest in
searching for the truth. Id. at 244, 398 A.2d at 888. The court's decision was
strongly influenced by its belief that the information could be secured through
other means that would be "less intrusive" on the attorney-client privilege. Id.
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it may be difficult for the attorney to determine if the client is
bragging or lying. Accurate prediction is a critical factor. A lawyer
would substantially compromise his client's interests by incriminating
him without at least a reasonable belief, let alone a moral certainty,
that the client truly intends to carry out his threat. 54 To date, few
cases have addressed a lawyer's duty in this situation." However,
two courts have imposed a duty upon a psychiatrist or psychologist
to warn a third party of threats to his safety made by a patient.5 6
In Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California,17 the
Supreme Court of California held that a therapist who had deter-
mined that his patient presented a serious danger of violence to a
third person, "incur[red] an obligation to use reasonable care to
protect the intended victim against such danger." 58 The Appellate
Division of the New Jersey Superior Court followed the Tarasoff
holding in McIntosh v. Milano.5 9 Both courts rejected the argument
that confidentiality is of the essence and should not be breached
where a therapist is unable to predict with certainty a patient's
dangerousness.60 The decisions in Tarasoff and McIntosh have pro-
voked much controversy. 61
Even if one accepts the proposition that a therapist can reasonably
predict a patient's behavior, 62 it is clear that a lawyer cannot do
so. Lawyers are not trained to predict or analyze future human
behavior and generally do not spend a sufficient amount of time
54. See LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note 4, at 1:115 (citing Rule 1.6 comment).
55. See, e.g., Hawkins v. King County, 602 P.2d 361 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979)
(no duty for attorney to warn victim of planned assault by client).
56. See Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California, 17 Cal. 3d 425,
551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976); McIntosh v. Milano, 168 N.J. Super. 466,
403 A.2d 500 (1979).
57. 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14.
58. Id. at 431, 551 P.2d at 340, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 20.
59. 168 N.J. Super. at 489, 403 A.2d at 511-12.
The facts in McIntosh are similar to those in Tarasoff. The defendant psychiatrist,
Milano, failed to warn Kimberly McIntosh that his patient had exhibited a threatening
attitude towards her, although not marked by any express threats of violence
directed against her. Id. at 473, 403 A.2d at 503-04. McIntosh subsequently was
murdered by the patient, and her mother brought the suit against Milano for failing
to warn Kimberly. Id. at 470, 403 A.2d at 502.
60. See id. at 490, 403 A.2d at 512; 17 Cal. 3d at 438, 551 P.2d at 347, 131
Cal. Rptr. at 27.
61. See, e.g., Cocozza and Steadman, The Failure of Psychiatric Prediction of
Dangerousness: Clear and Convincing Evidence, 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 1084 (1976);
Stone, The Tarasoff Decision: Suing Psychotherapists to Safeguard Society, 90
HARv. L. REV. 358 (1976). For an argument that psychiatrists are unable to reliably
predict dangerousness, see Diamond, The Psychiatric Prediction of Dangerousness,
123 U. PA. L. REV. 439 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Diamond].
62. But see Diamond, supra note 61, at 452 (arguing that psychiatrists cannot
predict patients' behavior).
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with their clients to draw reliable conclusions in this regard. 63 That
is not to say that a lawyer should not act upon information he
possesses which leads him to conclude with reasonable certainty that
his client intends to kill. 64 In extreme situations, it is the lawyer's
moral and ethical duty to prevent the intended crime. 65 Under normal
circumstances, however, it is not the function of the lawyer to report
intended crimes of the client. 66 Rather, client confidentiality should
be paramount.
When a lawyer has knowledge of a potential crime intermediate
steps should be pursued. First, the lawyer should attempt to dissuade
the client from committing the crime. 67 If his advice is rejected, the
lawyer should attempt to ascertain a means of warning the intended
victim which will have the least detrimental effect on his client. 68
In these situations, the lawyer must weigh the client's fifth and sixth
amendment rights against the likelihood that the crime will be com-
mitted. 69 Concomitantly, the lawyer must consider his ethical duties,
as stated in the Code and Rules. 70 While murder is an extreme
example, the same considerations apply to any violent criminal ac-
tivity planned by the client and disclosed to the attorney. In the
absence of reasonable certainty that death or serious physical injury
will result, the scale must tip toward confidentiality.
III. Fruits and Instrumentalities
A new client arrives at an attorney's office carrying a gun and
informs the attorney that the gun has just been involved in an
63. See id.
64. See Hodes, The Code of Professional Responsibility, The Kutak Rules and
the Trial Lawyers' Code: Surprisingly, Three Peas in a Pod, 35 U. MIAMI L. REV.
739, 754-58 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Hodes].
65. As an example of such an extreme situation, Hodes posits a case in which
the client tells his attorney that he will kill a named person on a date certain. Id.
at 755.
66. Los Angeles County Bar Ass'n, Comm. on Legal Ethics, Op. 386 (1980)
(no duty to disclose perjury of former client in continuing case); see also supra
notes 50-53 and accompanying text.
67. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
68. See CODE, supra note 4, EC 4-5 (lawyer should not use information obtained
in course of representation of client to disadvantage of client); see also supra note
54 and accompanying text. See generally Bender, Incriminating Evidence: What to
do With a Hot Potato, 11 COLO. LAWYER 881, 882 [hereinafter cited as Bender].
69. See Callan & David, supra note 34, at 355-56; see also supra notes 45-53
and accompanying text. This conclusion is based on an analogy to Tarasoff and
McIntosh, which require therapists weighing the possibility of disclosure to determine
whether a serious threat of violence to a third person is present.
70. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
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incident. The attorney believes both that the client has engaged in
criminal activity and that the gun is unregistered: "What if any, are
the lawyer's ethical or legal obligations with regard to the gun?
Several important issues arise. First, is the weapon entitled to pro-
tection under the Code's definition of a secret or confidence? 7'
Second, must the lawyer deliver the weapon to the authorities?72
Third, what is the proper manner in which to surrender an instru-
mentality while complying with the duty of confidentiality?"
Under the Code, an instrumentality does not qualify as a con-
fidence unless it is protected by the evidentiary privilege.7 4 Ostensibly,
however, it may be argued that an instrumentality such as a gun
fits within the strict definition of a secret, because it constitutes
detrimental and embarrassing information obtained from the client
during the professional relationship." Nevertheless, the cases generally
hold that an attorney may not retain possession of tangible evidence
of a crime.7 6
The seminal case in this area is In re Ryder.77 Ryder was an
attorney who represented a criminal defendant who had robbed a
bank. 7 The client authorized Ryder to remove the contents of his
safe deposit box, which was found to contain the proceeds of the
robbery and a sawed-off shotgun. 79 Ryder secreted these items in
his own safe deposit box. 0 As a result, Ryder was suspended from
71. The Code provision which defines the terms "confidence" and "secret,"
DR 4-101(A), is quoted supra at note 29. See also infra notes 74-75 and accompanying
text.
72. See infra notes 76-104 and accompanying text.
73. See infra notes 105-06 and accompanying text.
74. See supra note 29.
75. The gun is gained in the professional relationship and the client will have
requested that its existence be held secret. See CODE, supra note 4, DR 4-101(A).
76. See, e.g., In re Ryder, 263 F. Supp. 360 (E.D. Va.), aff'd, 381 F.2d 713
(4th Cir. 1967) (gun and proceeds of robbery); Morrell v. State, 575 P.2d 1200
(Alaska 1978) (handwritten plans to carry out kidnapping scheme); People v. Lee,
3 Cal. App. 3d 514, 527, 83 Cal. Rptr. 715, 723 (1970) (blood-stained shoes); See
generally Note, Fruits of the Attorney-Client Privilege: Incriminating Evidence and
Conflicting Duties, 3 DUQ. U. L. REV. 239 (1965); Note, Ethics, Law and Loyalty:
The Attorney's Duty to Turn Over Incriminating Physical Evidence, 32 STAN. L.
REV. 977 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Attorney's Duty]; Comment, The Right of a
Criminal Defense Attorney to Withhold Physical Evidence Received From His Client,
38 U. CHI. L. REV. 211 (1970); Comment, The Problem of An Attorney in Possession
of Evidence Incriminating His Client: The Need for a Predictable Standard, 47 U.
CIN. L. REV. 431 (1978); Note, Legal Ethics and the Destruction of Evidence, 88
YALE L.J. 1665 (1979).
77. 263 F. Supp. at 360.
78. Id. at 362.
79. Id. at 363.
80. Id.
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the practice of law."1 The court rejected the argument that the items
were protected by lawyer-client confidentiality.12 The court also re-
jected a fifth amendment argument by distinguishing items which
are subject to seizure while in the defendant's possession from items
which are immune from seizure while in the defendant's possession. 3
Since the money and the gun could be seized from the defendant,
they were not protected from disclosure while held by the defendant's
attorney. 4
Situations may arise in which an attorney receives incriminating
evidence from a third party such as a relative of a criminal de-
fendant.8 5 In these cases, the doctrine of confidentiality generally is
inapplicable. 6 Moreover, where physical evidence is concerned, the
legal proscriptions against concealing evidence and obstructing justice
outweigh any ethical duty to maintain a confidence. 7 It should be
recalled, however, that while the fifth amendment is inapplicable,88
the sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel may be
implicated when a third party gives incriminating evidence to the
attorney in trust for a criminal defendant.8 9
It is interesting to note certain caveats in the law relating to fruits
and instrumentalities of a crime. In State v. Olwell,90 the Supreme
Court of Washington affirmed the lower court's holding that an
attorney who refused to testify at an inquest regarding incriminating
physical evidence that he received from a client was not in contempt
81. Id. at 370. The case predates the Code. Therefore, it was decided under
the Canons of Professional Ethics. See supra note 4. The Court concluded that
Ryder violated the law by concealing evidence in violation of Canons 15 and 32.
263 F. Supp. at 369.
82. 263 F. Supp. at 365.
83. Id. at 365-66. In Ryder, the money and the gun were subject to seizure
while in the defendant's possession. The court thus distinguished two taxpayer
cases, United States v. Judson, 322 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1963) and Schwimmer v.
United States, 232 F.2d 855 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 833 (1956), on the
grounds that the papers sought from the attorney there would not be subject to
a subpoena duces tecum if in the taxpayer's possession. 263 F. Supp. at 365-66.
84. 263 F. Supp. at 366-67.
85. See, e.g., Morrell v. State, 575 P.2d 1200 (Alaska 1978) (evidence received
from defendant's house guest); People v. Lee, 3 Cal. App. 3d 514, 83 Cal. Rptr.
715 (1970) (evidence received from defendant's wife).
86. Morrell, 575 P.2d at 1210-11; Lee, 3 Cal. App. 3d at 527, 83 Cal. Rptr.
at 723.
87. See Ryder, 263 F. Supp. at 369.
88. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
89. See Morrell, 575 P.2d at 1211 n.17. For a discussion of the sixth amendment
as it relates to the ethical obligations of attorneys, see supra notes 1-8 and ac-
companying text. The sixth amendment is quoted supra at note 1.
90. 64 Wash.2d 828, 394 P.2d 681 (1964).
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of court. 9' The court stated that the attorney should, on his own
motion, deliver the suspect instrumentality to the prosecutor. 92 How-
ever, to preserve attorney-client confidentiality, the court concluded
that the jury should not be informed of the source of the instru-
mentality. 93
Another caveat in this line of cases emerges from Anderson v.
State.94 In Anderson, the attorney who came into possession of goods
stolen by his client turned them over to the police. 95 Both the attorney
and his receptionist were subpoenaed to testify. 96 The Florida ap-
pellate court held that neither the attorney nor his receptionist could
be compelled to divulge the source of the stolen goods. 97 Moreover,
the prosecutor was barred from introducing evidence that the defense
attorney's office delivered the stolen property. 9s The court noted that
ordinarily the attorney-client privilege does not extend to withholding
the identity of a client99 but concluded that, in the case at hand,
compelling the lawyer to testify as subpoenaed would do "violence"
to the attorney-client privilege.' °°
Once a client shows incriminating evidence to a lawyer, the lawyer
becomes obligated to advise the client to surrender it to him so that
91. Id. at 830-31, 394 P.2d at 683-84. But see Dyas v. State, 539 S.W.2d 251,
256 (Ark. 1976) (attorney received incriminating evidence from defendant's spouse;
Oiwell thus distinguished).
92. 64 Wash.2d at 832, 394 P.2d at 684-85.
93. Id. at 833, 394 P.2d at 685. The court weighed the prosecution's need to
recover the evidence against the defendant's privilege of confidentiality. Id.
94. 297 So. 2d 871 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 875.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 874. There is a paucity of authority relating to confidentiality of the
client's identity. Neither the Code nor the Rules address this issue. The general
rule, however, is that the client's identity is not protected under the attorney-client
evidentiary privilege. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 600 F.2d 215 (9th
Cir. 1979); In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Served Upon Field, 408 F. Supp. 1169
(S.D.N.Y. 1976).
There are specific exceptions to this general rule. Where sufficient information
regarding the lawyer-client relationship has already been revealed, such that disclosure
of the client's name would reveal the entire communication, the name may be
withheld. NLRB v. Harvey, 349 F.2d 900 (4th Cir. 1965). Similarly, where disclosure
of a client's identity would expose the client to criminal prosecution for a past
crime, the identity may be protected. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 600 F.2d 215
(9th Cir. 1979).
For a comprehensive analysis of questions concerning the confidentiality of client
identity, see Note, Disclosure of a Client's Identity: The Ethical Dilemma, 8 J.
OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 197 (1983).
100. Anderson, 297 So. 2d at 875.
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he may deliver it to the authorities.' 10 Otherwise, the attorney would
be directly or indirectly advising his client to conceal or destroy the
evidence. 102
When the client simply tells the lawyer the location of incriminating
evidence, the lawyer may go to the spot and observe the evidence
but may not touch or remove it. 103 Once the attorney takes the
affirmative step of touching or tampering with the physical evidence,
a duty to surrender it to the authorities arises. 04 A practical problem
is who are the proper authorities to whom the tangible evidence
must be delivered.
One author has suggested specific guidelines for the attorney faced
with fruits or instrumentalities of his client's crimes: (1) once the
lawyer accepts the property, it must be surrendered voluntarily to
the authorities; (2) the laywer should advise the client of his duty
to deliver the property to the authorities; (3) the lawyer must try to
discourage the client from destroying evidence; (4) the lawyer must
not disrupt, alter, or disturb the evidence. If he does, he must
surrender the property; (5) when surrending the evidence, the lawyer
should avoid revealing the client's identity or any statements the
client made about the evidence. In fact, a lawyer should consider
hiring a second lawyer to deliver the items; (6) the attorney should
make no statements unless he is compelled to do so by the court;
(7) the delivery should be made to the prosecutor, who as an attorney
should be more sensitive to attorney-client confidentiality than a
police official. 105
Among the most important of these recommendations is anony-
mous delivery. Anonymous surrender of incriminating evidence has
been sanctioned by the Ethics Committtee of the New York City
Bar Association. °6 A lawyer should avoid revealing the client's
101. Bender, supra note 68, at 887.
102. Id. DR 7-102(A)(7) prohibits an attorney from counseling his client to engage
in illegal conduct. CODE, supra note 4, DR 7-102(A)(7).
103. Bender, supra note 68, at 888.
104. Id. at 888-89; cf. People v. Belge, 83 Misc. 2d 186, 372 N.Y.S.2d 798,
aff'd, 50 A.D.2d 1088, 376 N.Y.S.2d 771 (4th Dep't 1975), aff'd, 41 N.Y.2d 60,
359 N.E.2d 370, 390 N.Y.S.2d 867 (1976) (attorney did no more than observe
location of corpse; no violation of public health laws to fail to report location of
body to proper authorities).
105. Bender, supra note 68, at 892-93.
106. New York City Bar Ass'n Ethics Committee, Op. 81-99 (1981). The
Committee stated: "[A] lawyer must decide what the law requires and do nothing
beyond the requirements of the law which would endanger the confidentiality of
confidences and secrets." Id.; see also New York State Bar Ass'n, Comm. on
Professional Ethics, Op. 405 (1975) and Op. 466 (1977) (if no legal duty to disclose
physical evidence, duty to preserve client confidences is paramount and no ethical
duty attaches); cf. New York State Bar Ass'n, Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op.
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identity or the circumstances under which he obtained possession of
the evidence. 10 7 What is required is a buffer between the prosecuting
authorities and the defense lawyer. The most efficacious and readily
available buffer is the administrative judge of the court.'0 8 Incrim-
inating evidence could be delivered to the administrative judge who
would then weigh the probative value of the item against its prej-
udicial effect. As a result of this balancing process, the evidence
either would be admitted at trial or excluded. Furthermore, the
administrative judge could determine which additional facts about
the evidence should be deemed admissible and which should be
excluded."°" This procedure would assure that the trial judge would
not be prejudiced by apprisal of all the facts and circumstances
relating to the incriminating evidence, thus maintaining client con-
fidentiality to the utmost degree permitted by law.'10
IV. Client Perjury
During the course of a trial or immediately thereafter, a lawyer
learns that his client committed perjury or urged another defense
witness to perjure himself."' May the lawyer keep the client's secret?
In this situation there are two fundamental considerations. There is
the legal obligation to avoid the subornation of perjury. 112 At the
530 (1981) (attorney has duty to turn over documentary evidence surreptitiously
removed from police headquarters).
107. Bender, supra note 68, at 892.
108. The position of chief administrator, or administrative judge of the New
York court system is described in the New York Judiciary Law, Sections 210-17.
N.Y. JUD. LAW §§ 210-17 (McKinney 1984). The chief administrative judge is
vested with authority to designate administrative judges for the lower state courts,
id. § 212(l)(d), and to adopt rules and orders regulating practice in the courts.
Id. § 212(2)(d).
109. Although the administrative judge is not specifically vested with authority
to perform these functions under the New York Judiciary Law, it could be argued
that such duties are encompassed within the administrative judges' general super-
visory duties. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 211. Furthermore, the law could be amended to
provide a specific grant of authority to administrative judges in cases involving
confidentiality claims.
110. The client is protected because information about his identity and the
circumstances under which the evidence was recovered would not be revealed to
the trial judge. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
1 11. Perjury is defined as "a crime committed when a lawful oath is administered,
in some judicial proceeding, to a person who swears wilfully, absolutely and falsely,
in a matter material to the issue or point in question." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1025 (5th ed. 1979).
112. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 210 (McKinney 1975). It is not clear whether
an attorney who does not procure the false testimony can be held criminally liable.
See In re Hardenbrook, 135 A.D. 634, 121 N.Y.S. 250 (1st Dept. 1909); appeal
denied, 145 A.D. 935, 129 N.Y.S. 1126 (1911), aff'd per curiam, 199 N.Y. 539,
92 N.E. 1086 (1910). In Hardenbrook, the Appellate Division, First Department,
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same time, there are ethical duties to the court and to the client.
Disciplinary Rule 7-102(A) of the Code provides in pertinent part
that in his representation of a client, a lawyer shall not: "[k]nowingly
use perjured testimony or false evidence.""' Thus, an attorney is
prohibited from suborning perjury. In the normal course of events
an attorney is also under a duty to report perjury to the tribunal.
Disciplinary Rule 7-102(B)(1) provides:
(B) A lawyer who receives information clearly establishing that:
(1) His client has, in the course of the representation, perpetrated
a fraud upon a person or tribunal shall promptly call upon his
client to rectify the same, and if his client refuses or is unable
to do so, he shall reveal the fraud to the affected person or
tribunal, except when the information is protected as a privileged
communication. 114
stated that "it is quite probable that ...more than mere knowledge by a lawyer
examining a witness in court that the witness is committing perjury is necessary
to justify a conviction" for the subornation of perjury. 135 A.D. at 643, 121
N.Y.S. at 257.
Professor Monroe Freedman suggests that where an attorney advises his client
that perjury is unlawful but then permits his client to testify, the element of
wilfulness is lacking. M. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM
31 (1975) [hereinafter cited as FREEDMAN]. But see Meagher, A Critique of Lawyers'
Ethics in An Adversary System, 4 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 289 (1976). Meagher asserts
that when an attorney knowingly elicits false testimony, the requisite intent is
present. Id. at 290. This view is also stated in Herbert v. United States, 340 A.2d
802, 804 (D.C. 1975) (citing Gregory v. United States, 369 F.2d 185, 188 (D.C.
Cir. 1966)). Since this Article focuses on ethical duties, the law on suborning
prejury is outside its scope. See generally Wolfram, Client Perjury, 50 S. CAL. L.
REV. 809 (1977). It has been suggested that in a federal case an attorney may
violate 18 U.S.C.§ 2(a) which provides that whoever aids, abets, counsels, commands,
induces, or procures the commission of an offense against the United States is
punishable as a principal. 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) (1983). See generally 64 A.L.R.3d 385,
387 (1975).
113. CODE, supra note 4, DR 7-102(A)(4).
114. Id. DR 7-102(B)(l) (emphasis added). The italicized exception was not
originally part of the Rule, but was added in 1974.
Originally, three mandatory disclosure provisions existed under the Canons of
Professional Ethics. Canon I applied to complaints against judges, Canon 29 created
an obligation to expose dishonest lawyers, and Canon 41 pertained to perjury and
informing the injured party of a client's fraud. CANONS, supra note 4, Canons 1,
29 and 41.
When the Code was originally drafted in 1969, the duty under Canon 41 to
expose client frauds was incorporated in Disciplinary Rule 7 without the exception
for privileged communications. This created conflicting duties. Under certain cir-
cumstances, a lawyer was obliged to disclose otherwise privileged information
concerning his client. Yet, he was also under a duty to keep client confidences in
order to effectively and zealously represent his client.
Soon after the insertion of the privileged communications caveat, the ABA had
occasion to interpret the meaning of the phrase "privileged communications." The
phrase was interpreted to comprise both confidences and secrets as defined in DR
4-101. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 341 (1975).
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This provision presents a difficult and perplexing moral dilemma
for the attorney."5 In reaching a decision as to the proper course
of action, a lawyer must consider not only his legal and ethical
obligations but also the client's constitutional rights to due process' 16
and effective assistance of counsel." 7 A fundamental aspect of the
obligation to provide effective representation includes the requirement
that the attorney proffer any admissible testimony the client wishes
to present unless the lawyer knows it to be fraudulent."' Knowledge
is the key. A lawyer may not determine that testimony is false based
on mere inconsistencies in the client's recital of the facts. Instead,
the attorney must possess a firm factual basis before concluding
that his client is lying."
19
115. FREEDMAN, supra note 112, at 28-29.
116. Due process is a general concept that encompasses numerous other specific
rights. Thus, while there is no constitutional provision granting the right to testify
on one's own behalf, such a right is covered by the broad umbrella of due process
under the fifth and fourteenth amendments, and thus, is a client right which the
lawyer must respect. See Farretta v. California, 442 U.S. 806, 819-20 n.15 (1975);
Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S.
222, 225 (1971); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 433 (1944); see also Hughes
v. State, 513 P.2d 1115 (Alaska 1973); Arizona v. Noble, 109 Ariz. 539, 514 P.2d
460 (1973); People v. Robles, 2 Cal. 3d 205, 466 P.2d 710, 85 Cal. Rptr. 166
(1970); People v. Farrar, 36 Mich. App. 294, 193 N.W.2d 363 (1972).
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has held that while every defendant is privileged
to testify, this privilege shall not be construed to include a right to commit perjury.
Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225 (1971).
117. The Supreme Court has held that the sixth amendment encompasses the
right to effective assistance of counsel before, during and after trial. See Argersinger
v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972) (no person may be imprisoned for even petty offenses
unless represented by competent counsel); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218
(1967) (right to effective assistance prior to trial at critical prosecutive stages);
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (right to competent counsel on appeal);
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel extended to states
via fourteenth amendment); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932) (Court's
duty to assign counsel, in capital case, "is not discharged by an assignment at
such time or under such circumstances as to preclude the giving of effective aid
in the preparation and trial of the case"). For a general discussion of the standards
of attorney competence, see Finer, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 58 CORNELL
L. REV. 1077 (1973); Gard, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel-Standards and
Remedies, 41 Mo. L. REV. 483 (1976); Stone, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
and Post-Conviction Relief in Criminal Cases.- Changing Standards and Practical
Consequences, 7 COLUM. HUMAN RIGHTS L. REV. 427 (1976).
118. Ethical Consideration 7-26 provides:
The law and Disciplinary Rules prohibit the use of fraudulent, false, or
perjured testimony or evidence. A lawyer who knowingly participates in
introduction of such testimony or evidence is subject to discipline. A
lawyer should, however, present any admissible evidence his client desires
to have presented unless he knows, or from facts within his knowledge
should know, that such testimony or evidence is false, fraudulent, or
perjured.
CODE, supra note 4, EC 7-26.
119. United States ex rel Wilcox v. Johnson, 555 F.2d 115, 120 (3d Cir. 1917);
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One commentator has suggested:
[B]ecause of the unique character of the relationship between
attorney and client, a strong argument can be made that the level
of certainty of wrongdoing an advocate should reach before re-
vealing the client's alleged wrongdoing is even higher than the
level of certainty required of the trier of fact in a criminal
proceeding . . . . Great violence would be done to [the attorney-
client] relationship and the values it reflects if clients could not
be confident that their lawyers would not turn against them unless
their wrongdoings were completely indisputable.120
There does not appear to be an affirmative duty to investigate
the client's story for the purpose of disproving it. 121 However, once
the attorney reasonably believes that his client intends to commit,
or is in fact committing perjury, the attorney has three options: (1)
to allow the defendant to testify in the normal fashion asking rele-
vant questions to direct the testimony; 22 (2) to ask no questions but
permit the defendant to deliver a free-flowing narrative; 23 or (3) to
attempt to withdraw from the case."'2 Serious problems exist in each
of these courses of action.
The first option is clearly impermissible under Disciplinary Rule
7-102(A)(4),' 25 which prohibits the knowing use of perjured testi-
mony. 126 It should be noted, however, that under the proposed
American Lawyer's Code of Conduct this course of action was
recommended. 127
see State v. Lloyd, 48 Md. App. 535, 542, 429 A.2d 244, 248 (1981) (citing State
v. Whiteside, 272 N.W.2d 468, 469 (Iowa 1978)) (defense counsel should not dictate
what is true and what is false absent "compelling support for his conclusion").
120. Brazil, Unanticipated Client Perjury and the Collision of Rules of Ethics,
Evidence, and Constitutional Law, 44 Mo. L. REV. 601, 609 (1979) (emphasis
added).
121. See State v. Zwillman, 112 N.J. Super. 6, 16, 270 A.2d 284, 289 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1970).
122. See infra notes 126-27 and accompanying text.
123. See infra notes 128-43 and accompanying text.
124. See infra notes 146-59 and accompanying text.
125. CODE, supra note 4, DR 7-102(A)(4).
126. Id. Moreover, DR 1-102(4) prohibits engaging in dishonest, fraudulent or
deceitful conduct, and DR 1-102(5) prohibits engaging in conduct that is "prejudicial
to the administration of justice." CODE, supra note 4, DR 1-102(4) & (5). Finally,
DR 4-101 provides that a lawyer may reveal his client's intention to commit a
crime such as perjury. Id. DR 4-101. Thus, perjury is not protected by client
confidentiality under the Code.
127. Under the leadership of Professor Freedman, a commission of the Roscoe
Pound-American Trial Lawyers Foundation was formed to establish a new code
for lawyer conduct. Under the Public Discussion Draft released in December 1981,
the protection of client confidences outweighs almost every other consideration
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The second option, merely sitting back and permitting the de-
fendant to present his narrative, seems more appealing. In fact, it
is authorized under the American Bar Association (ABA) Defense
Standards in the event that withdrawal from the case is not possible.128
However, this option clearly contravenes the Code and existing law.,29
It would be unethical for an attorney to refer to his client's testimony
in his summation to the jury, knowing it to be false. On the other
hand, the failure to summarize and argue that testimony alerts the
jury that the testimony lacks credibility or merit. Additionally, since
the prosecution is permitted to comment on any failure to argue
the defendant's testimony, defense counsel's omission of this tes-
timony in the summation is potentially prejudicial to the defendant's
case.' 30 In effect, by choosing this second option, the attorney tells
the jury that the defendant is lying, and is, therefore, guilty.' 3'
including candor to the tribunal. THE AMERICAN LAWYER'S CODE OF CONDUCT ch.
1 Comment (American Trial Lawyers Foundation Discussion Draft 1981) [hereinafter
cited as CODE OF CONDUCT]. Thus, if the attorney permits the defendant to take
the stand, conducts a normal direct examination and argues the testimony to the
jury in summation of the case, he has not violated the Code of Conduct. Id.
(Illustrative Case 1(j)). Moreover, under the Code of Conduct, failure to present
a client's false testimony would subject the attorney to discipline. Id.; see Erickson,
The Perjurious Defendant: A Proposed Solution to the Defense Lawyer's Conflicting
Ethical Obligations to the Court and to His Client, 59 DEN. L.J. 75, 86-87 (1981)
[hereinafter cited as Erickson]; FREEDMAN, supra note 112, at 31; Comment, The
Perjury Dilemma In An Adversary System, 82 DICK. L. REV. .545, 552 (1978).
128. ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING
TO THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND THE DEFENSE FUNCTION 274-75, § 7.7 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as ABA DEFENSE STANDARDS]. Under the ABA Defense Standards,
an attorney is instructed first to seek withdrawal without revealing the basis for
the motion. Id. If the motion is denied the defendant may give a narrative statement.
No guidance is provided as to redirect or how to handle an objection by the
prosecution to this mode of testimony. See FREEDMAN, supra note 112, at 37.
Under the ABA Defense Standards the attorney may not refer to the perjurious
testimony in his arguments to the jury. ABA DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra at 274-
75, § 7.7. While still a judge of the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals,
Warren Burger asserted that where the attorney is not permitted to withdraw, "[h]e
should confine himself to asking the witness to identify himself and to make a
statement, but he cannot participate in the fraud by conventional direct exami-
nation." Burger, Standards of Conduct for Prosecution and Defense Personnel: A
Judge's Viewpoint, 5 AM. CRIM. L. Q. 11, 13 (1966).
129. State v. Whiteside, 272 N.W.2d 468, 470 (Iowa 1978) (attorney for criminal
defendant not required to present perjured testimony); Bennett v. State, 549 S.W.2d
585, 587 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977) (defense attorney in criminal prosecution shall not
present perjured testimony).
130. Erickson, supra note 127, at 83.
131. Casual summation by an attorney has been deemed prejudicial because it
indicates disbelief in the defendant's testimony and thus constitutes a violation of
the defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel. Matthews v. United States,
449 F.2d 985, 992-94 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (Leventhal, J., concurring); cf. Johns v.
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The risk of selecting the second option was dramatized in Lowery
v. Cardwell.' Jacqueline Lowery was indicted and tried for first
degree murder in a shooting incident.' She waived her right to trial
by jury and the case was tried by a judge. 3 4 Lowery testified that
she did not walk outside with the victim, did not go to his car,
and did not shoot him.'35 On eliciting this testimony, defense counsel
requested a recess and, in chambers, moved to withdraw from the
case. He refused to state his reasons for moving to be relieved.
3 6
The judge denied the motion. Upon his return to the courtroom,
defense counsel stated that he had no further questions. 7 During
the closing statements, defendant's lawyer did not refer to her tes-
timony and argued only that reasonable doubt was present and that
no case existed for first-degree murder.' 38 The judge found Lowery
guilty of second-degree murder.139
On appeal from denial of a writ of habeas corpus, the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. 40 The court held that the
defense attorney's conduct deprived the defendant of a fair trial.' 4'
It is interesting to note that despite this holding, the court cited the
ABA Defense Standards with approval."t 2 The court distinguished
between "a passive refusal to lend aid to perjury [permitted by the
ABA Defense Standards] and [the] direct action . . . [of pursuing
a] court order granting leave to withdraw [as had occurred in
Lowery].' ' 43 The court concluded that "this conduct affirmatively
and emphatically called the attention of the fact finder to the problem
Smyth, 176 F. Supp. 949, 953 (E.D. Va. 1959) (attorney's conscience prevented
him from arguing client's case to jury).
132. 575 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1978); see State v. Lowery, 111 Ariz. 26, 523 P.2d
54 (1974) for disposition of case at state level.
133. 575 F.2d at 728.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 729.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 732.
141. 575 F.2d at 731. In a concurring opinion, Judge Hufstedler concluded that
the defendant's sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel had been
violated. 575 F.2d at 732.
142. 575 F.2d at 731 n.5.
143. Id. at 731. It has been suggested that a further distinction exists between
knowing prior to trial that the client intends to lie and being surprised by the
client's perjury at trial. Id. at 730-31, citing ABA DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra note
128, § 7.7.
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counsel was facing"' 44 and thus jeopardized the defendant's fair trial
rights. '45
The third option available to a defense lawyer who knows that
his client intends to lie is to move to withdraw from the case. This
is the recommended first step under the ABA Defense Standards.' 44
A majority of the cases approve of seeking withdrawal where counsel
is unable to dissuade his client from committing perjury.147
For example, in State v. Henderson,148 the defendant informed
his attorney a few days before the trial that he intended to perjure
himself.149 The attorney decided to withdraw from the case. He
contacted the deputy county attorney, and together they orally
applied to both the trial judge and the administrative judge for his
removal from the case.150 Both judges were informed that the de-
fendant intended to lie on the witness stand. The request was de-
nied.' 5 ' The defendant was informed of these events the next day.152
The defendant refused to demand a new lawyer, hoping to win on
appeal on the ground that his attorney had violated client confi-
dentiality., Based on these facts, defense counsel again requested
to be relieved. Once again the request was denied. 15 4 After completion
of the state's case, a third request to withdraw was denied.' On
appeal from his conviction, Henderson asserted that he was denied
fair representation. 5 6 The court held that the attorney properly
requested permission to withdraw and that the trial court properly
exercised its discretion in refusing to grant the request.,5 7 The court
reasoned that the defendant's refusal to request new counsel was
immaterial, since the same dilemma would have arisen if new counsel
had been appointed.158
144. 575 F.2d at 731.
145. Id.
146. ABA DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra note 128, § 7.7(a).
147. See, e.g., Thornton v. United States, 357 A.2d 429 (D.C.), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1024 (1976); State v. Fosnight, 235 Kan. 52, 679 P.2d 174 (1984); In re
Palmer, 296 N.C. 638, 252 S.E.2d 784 (1979); State v. Trapp, 52 Ohio App. 2d
189, 368 N.E.2d 1278 (1977).
148. 205 Kan. 231, 468 P.2d 136 (1970).
149. Id. at 233, 468 P.2d at 138.
150. Id. at 233-34, 468 P.2d at 138-39.
151. Id. at 234, 468 P.2d at 139.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 234-35, 468 P.2d at 139-40.
156. Id. at 235-36, 468 P.2d at 139-40.
157. Id. at 239, 468 P.2d at 141-42.
158. Id. at 238, 468 P.2d at 141-42.
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The Henderson court erroneously approved of the defense attor-
ney's method of seeking withdrawal. In seeking withdrawal, an
attorney must avoid prejudice to the client while preserving the
client's fair trial and due process rights. The Henderson court erred
in determining that the attorney had not violated his duty of con-
fidentiality. 15 9
A preferable approach was suggested by the Colorado Supreme
Court in People v. Schultheis.160 In Schultheis, the court provided
four guidelines. First, a lawyer may not offer perjured or false
testimony.' 6' The court reasoned that as an officer of the court a
lawyer owes a duty not to perpetrate fraud. Second, when efforts
to dissuade the client from lying fail, the attorney must seek to
withdraw.1 62 The Schultheis court held that this duty to attempt to
withdraw does not arise merely upon learning of the client's intention.
Rather, the duty arises when serious disagreement as to the pres-
entation of evidence and conduct of the trial occurs.' 63 The court
rejected mandatory withdrawal, noting that under certain circum-
stances withdrawal would be impractical. 64 Third, the court reasoned
that the client's communication of his intention to commit perjury
159. Id. at 237, 468 P.2d at 141. The court stated:
While as a general rule counsel is not allowed to disclose information
imparted to him by his client or acquired during their professional relation,
unless authorized to do so by the client himself [citation omitted], the
announced intention of a client to commit perjury, or any other crime,
is not included within the confidences which an attorney is bound to
respect. [citation omitted]
Id.
160. 638 P.2d 8 (Colo. 1981). In Schultheis, the defendant was charged with
the murder of a fellow inmate in the Denver County Jail. Schultheis demanded
that his attorney call two alibi witnesses but intimated that they would lie. Schultheis'
attorney, faced with his ethical duty not to present false evidence, moved to
withdraw. The motion was denied. Schultheis ultimately was convicted of first
degree murder.
The Colorado Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, finding a denial of
effective assistance in refusing to relieve the attorney. 618 P.2d 710, 714. The
Supreme Court of Colorado, in turn, reversed the court of appeals and directed
it to affirm the defendant's conviction. 638 P.2d at 15. See generally Note, Lying
Clients and Legal Ethics: The Attorney's Unsolved Dilemma, 16 CREIGHTON L.
REV. 487 (1983); Note, Perjured Alibi Testimony: The Defense Attorney's Conflicting
Duties, 48 Mo. L. REV. 257 (1983).
161. 638 P.2d at 11.
162. Id. at 13.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 14-15. The court realized that a motion to withdraw on the eve of
trial would cause undue delay and that a defendant could cause further delays by
retaining several attorneys in succession, informing each of his intention to lie.
Alternatively, the court posited that the client would lie to his attorney and the
perjured testimony would be presented. Id.
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is privileged. 65 Thus, counsel should not reveal to the judge either
the specific reasons for withdrawing or the Code provision under
which he seeks to withdraw.' 66 Counsel should merely state that he
has irreconcilable differences with the client. 167 Fourth, if the motion
to withdraw is denied, the attorney must continue to effectively
represent his client.1 68
It is clear that an attorney must safeguard his client's rights even
while seeking to withdraw from representation. One commentator
has proposed the establishment of advisory councils which would
function outside the judicial system. 16 9 A trial attorney, upon learning
of his client's intention to commit perjury or present false evidence,
could submit a written statement to the council outlining the basis
for his decision to withdraw. 170 The council would then make a
recommendation to the court on the request. If the claim were
deemed substantial, the council would advise the court to allow the
lawyer to withdraw.' 7 ' This recommendation would appear on the
outside of a sealed file and would bind the court. 72 The information
in the file would be available for impeachment purposes if the
defendant took the witness stand. If the next appointed counsel
learned of the client's intention to commit perjury and also sought
permission to withdraw, the court would be permitted to open the
two files submitted by the council. This information could then be
used to preclude the defendant from testifying and could be con-
sidered as a factor in sentencing. 73
While this proposal seeks to protect the defendant, it too is
impractical. Undoubtedly, it would take great effort to form advisory
councils. Additionally, unless volunteers came forward, the personnel
165. Id. at 13. This construction is narrower than Disciplinary Rule 4-101(C)(3)
of the Code, which permits, but does not require, disclosure of a client's intention
to commit a crime. CODE, supra note 4, DR 4-101(C)(3). However, the court's
view is consistent with Rule 1.6, which permits disclosure only of crimes likely to
result in bodily harm. RULES, supra note 11, Rule 1.6. Rule 1.6 is quoted supra
at note 11.
166. 638 P.2d at 13.
167. Id. at 14.
168. See id. The Rules similarly provide that where a motion to withdraw is
denied the "lawyer shall continue representation notwithstanding good cause for
terminating the representation." RULES, supra note 11, Rule 1.6.
169. Erickson, supra note 127, at 88-91. The Advisory Council would be composed
of eminent trial lawyers, selected on the basis of their experience, integrity, and
standing at the trial bar. Id. at 88-89.
170. Id. at 89.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 90.
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costs of such a venture could be great. A more workable and equally
effective solution, which already exists, is utilization of the admin-
istrative judge.
When an attorney contemplates withdrawal from a case, he should
apply to the administrative judge rather than the trial judge. In this
way, the trial judge is not made aware that the defendant intends
to perjure himself. If permission to withdraw is denied, the lawyer
should not reveal client confidences. Rather, the lawyer must provide
that degree of effective assistance which falls short of actual su-
bornation of perjury. ,74
In responding to these dilemmas, an attorney should pinpoint
exactly when he learned of his client's perjury. For example, if the
lawyer learns of his client's fraud on the court months after the
client has testified, the duty to preserve client confidences prevails.175
On the other hand, a lawyer may not assist in his client's perjury
if he learns in advance of the client's intention to lie.176 Specifically,
an attorney may never permit his client to sign an affidavit which
he knows to be false.177 Similarly, it would be unethical to address
the court on information and belief knowing the statements to be
false. 78 A lawyer may not assist in the preparation of a false alibi
or other false testimony. 79 Notwithstanding the importance of client
confidentiality, a lawyer may never suborn perjury.
V. Sentencing Hearing
Prior to sentencing, a client confides in his lawyer that he is
nervous because of his prior convictions and the effect they will
174. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
175. See ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 287
(1953). In that case the client lied about certain dates during a divorce proceeding.
Three months later the client came to the attorney because his former wife was
threatening to reveal his perjury unless he provided her with support money. The
ABA committee opined that the duty to preserve confidences prevailed over the
duty to reveal client deceptions. Id.
Reviewing that opinion in 1975, the ABA committee reiterated that tradition
coupled with substantial policy considerations guide the lawyer to ensure that client
secrets will not be revealed. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility,
Formal Op. 341 (1975). The committee concluded that this interpretation does not
go "too far" in relieving an attorney of liability to others since a lawyer is
compelled to disclose fraud if the information is obtained outside the confidential
relationship. Id.
176. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
177. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
178. See CODE, supra note 4, DR 7-102(A)(5) and DR 7-106(C)(1).
179. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
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have on the sentence. During the sentencing hearing, it is apparent
that the judge is misinformed when he comments on the defendant's
clear record as he imposes a minimum sentence. May the lawyer
remain silent? Or, must the lawyer respect his obligation of candor
to the tribunal and straighten out the misunderstanding?
These facts closely resemble the perjury situation.1 0 Analytically,
however, this hypothetical is distinguishable because silence rather
than affirmative falsehood is involved. In this situation, client con-
fidentiality supersedes any other duty. An ABA opinion rendered
in 1953 supports this contention.18 In that opinion, the ABA Ethics
Committee concluded that no duty exists to reveal the client's pre-
vious criminal record if his attorney learned of it through the client's
communications.8' The same result would be reached under the
Rules. In fact, under the Rules, the client's criminal record would
be privileged even if the attorney learned of it from a third party
as long as the information was received in the course of represen-
tation. 183
A different situation is presented if the judge directly inquires of
the attorney whether he knows of any prior convictions. Although
an attorney must do all that is within his power to protect a client's
confidential communications, he may not lie to the court.1 4 The
attorney may not respond negatively when he, in fact, knows of prior
convictions." 5 Nor may he affirmatively disclose the information he
has learned from his client since he is obliged to keep it confidential.8 6
In essence, the judge is asking whether the defendant has committed
prior crimes and this information uniformly is subject to the privilege
of confidentiality.187 The mere fact that the information is being
used only for the purpose of sentencing does not substantially alter
the attorney's duty of confidentiality. The attorney's only alternative
is to remain silent and seek to be excused to see the administrative
judge.' At all times, the notion of candor to the tribunal must be
weighed against the duty of confidentiality.
180. See supra notes 111-79 and accompanying text.
181. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 287 (1953).
182. Id.
183. See RuLEs, supra note 11, Rule 1.6.
184. See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
185. Id.
186. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
187. See supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text.
188. See supra notes 108-10 & 173 and accompanying text for discussion of
utilization of the administrative judge.
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VI. Fugitive Client
Pending appeal, a client is released on his own recognizance. The
appeal is unsuccessful and the client is ordered to report to prison.
He then flees the country. Later, the client informs his lawyer of
his foreign address and asks him to tell the federal authorities that
he is trying, albeit with difficulty, to return to the United States.
The lawyer complies. Eventually the client returns to the United
States, but he will not report to the federal authorities. Based on
the mail he receives from his client, the lawyer is certain that he
knows where the client is located, but he remains silent. The client
requests that his attorney not reveal his whereabouts. What are the
lawyer's duties?
This situation is not a hypothetical, but a real case that posed
an ethical dilemma for an attorney in the state of Delaware. 18 9 The
United States Attorney demanded that the attorney provide the actual
letters and postcards from the client.190 The Delaware Bar Association
advised the attorney that it would not be unethical to turn over the
requested information. 19' The Delaware Bar Committee cited ABA
Opinion 155192 which provided:
When the communication by the client to his attorney is in respect
to the future commission of an unlawful act or to a continuing
wrong, the communication is not privileged. One who is actually
engaged in committing a wrong can have no privileged witnesses,
and public policy forbids that an attorney should assist in the
commission thereof, or permit the relation of attorney and client
to conceal the wrongdoing.
A defendant in a criminal case when admitted to bail is not only
regarded as in the custody of his bail, but he is also in the
custody of the law, and admission to bail does not deprive the
court of its inherent power to deal with the person of the prisoner.
Being in lawful custody, the defendant is guilty of an escape when
he gains his liberty before he is delivered in due process of law,
and is guilty of a separate offense for which he may be punished.
In failing to disclose his client's whereabouts as fugitive under
these circumstances the attorney would not only be aiding his
client to escape trial on the charge for which he was indicted,
189. Delaware State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 1978-1 (1978).
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 155 (1936),
withdrawn, ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op.
84-349 (1984); see infra notes 217-19 and accompanying text.
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but would likewise be aiding him in evading prosecution for the
additional offense of escape.19'
In the case cited by the Delaware Bar Committee, the ABA Ethics
Committee concluded that the attorney would be subject to discipline
for refusing to disclose information to the authorities and for con-
tinuing to represent a fugitive client.' 94 The Delaware State Bar
Ethics Committee found that Opinion 155 was controlling and no
privilege was accorded to the information and documents sought by
the United States Attorney's Office. 95
In 1970, in the course of advising an attorney representing an
army deserter, the ABA Ethics Committee drew a clear distinction
between what was and was not within the ambit of confidentiality.' 96
If the fugitive asked the lawyer about his rights, then the attorney's
advice was privileged. However, if the fugitive asked the lawyer for
advice on how to flee or to remain a fugitive, the lawyer had a
threefold obligation.' 97 First, the lawyer must advise the client to
surrender himself to the proper authorities. 98 Second, if the client
refuses to surrender, the lawyer must withdraw from representation. 199
Third, the lawyer must warn the client that he has an ethical duty
to reveal the client's whereabouts if the illegal desertion persists and
the conduct is brought to his attention again by the client.2z°
The reasoning of the above opinions201 is faulty and is violative
of the attorney-client privilege. Sound public policy mandates pre-
serving client confidences. 20 2 New York City Bar Association Ethics
Committee Opinion 81-13203 presents a cogent approach to this sit-
uation. Opinion 81-13 dealt with an attorney who knew where his
client, who had fled from justice, was hiding. 204
The New York City Bar Association Ethics Committee reasoned
193. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 155; see
also ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 156 (1936) (client violated
terms and conditions of probation), withdrawn, ABA Comm. on Ethics and Profes-
sional Responsibility, Formal Op. 84-349; New York County Bar Ass'n, Ethics Op.
462 (1958) (client defaulted and forfeited bail money).
194. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 155.
195. Delaware State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 1978-1.
196. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Informal Op. 1141 (1970).
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. See supra notes 189-200 and accompanying text.
202. See supra notes 4-18 and accompanying text.
203. New York City Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm., Op. 81-13 (1981).
204. Id.
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that the information was obtained through the attorney-client re-
lationship, and thus, was protected under Disciplinary Rule 4-101.205
The Committee stated that if the client's flight constitutes a crime,
it is a continuing crime which the attorney may reveal pursuant to
Disciplinary Rule 4-101(C) but which he is not required to reveal.2"6
Furthermore, the Committee determined that a lawyer has a duty
to apprise his client of the consequences of his flight.207 Significantly,
the Committee departed from the view expressed by the ABA in
Informal Opinion 1141208 and concluded that an attorney is permitted
to withdraw from representation of the fleeing client20 9 but is not
required to do so. Thus, if the attorney believes that his client's
conduct constitutes a crime, he should not knowingly counsel his
client to remain a fugitive. Nevertheless, continued representation
by the lawyer would not constitute a violation of Disciplinary Rule
7-.102(A)(7). 20
The opinion of the New York City Ethics Committee refuted the
ABA Formal Opinion 155's premise that continued representation
tacitly encourages the client not to return.2 ' The New York Committee
reasoned that continued representation would ultimately promote client
adherence to the law. 212 Moreover, it acknowledged that all persons,
regardless of their conduct, are entitled to legal advice and that the
legal system benefits when such advice is available. 2'3 Although the
Code proscribes attorney involvement in the commission of crime
through advice to clients, the mere maintenance of a lawyer-client
relationship should not be equated with involvement. 2 4 The Code
205. Id.; CODE, supra note 4, DR 4-101.
206. New York City Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm., Op. 81-13. CODE, supra note 4,
DR 4-101(C).
207. New York City Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm., Op. 81-13.
208. See supra notes 196-200 and accompanying text.
209. New York City Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm., Op. 81-13; see CODE, supra note
4, DR 7-102(A)(7) and DR 2-110.
210. Disciplinary Rule 7-102(A)(7) provides: "In his representation of a client,
a lawyer shall not: . . . (7) Counsel or assist his client in conduct that the lawyer
knows to be illegal or fraudulent." CODE, supra note 4, DR 7-102(A)(7). The
Second Circuit Court of Appeals has expressly recognized the power of the District
Court to entertain motions to dismiss indictments on behalf of fugitives represented
by counsel. United States v. Weinstein, 511 F.2d 622, 629 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
422 U.S. 1042 (1975). Any other result would preclude the attorney from negotiating
his client's surrender.
211. See supra notes 192-94 and accompanying text.
212. New York City Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm., Op. 81-13.
213. Id.
214. See CODE, supra note 4, DR 7-102(A)(7)(1) (quoted supra at note 210).
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grants discretion to attorneys,2"5 and it would be inconsistent with
the Code to require an attorney to withdraw. 2' 6
Recently, the ABA withdrew Formal Opinions 155217 and 156,218
reasoning that they were inconsistent with both the Rules and the
Code.2"9 Thus, the New York precedent seems to have prevailed, 2 0
and the reasoning underlying the Delaware opinion has been called
into question. 22'
What are the practical consequences of these opinions? In view
of the fact that the client's whereabouts may constitute a secret or
a confidence under the Code, what course of action would an attorney
subpoenaed by a grand jury follow when asked where his client is
hiding? First, the lawyer must assess whether the information is a
"confidence" subject to the attorney-client evidentiary privilege, which
is considerably narrower in scope than the privilege given to client
secrets.222 Although the attorney may not classify his client's wher-
abouts as a secret, if.he in good faith classifies them as a confidence,
an ethical duty to preserve confidentiality still arises. 223 Consequently,
the attorney should assert the privilege of confidentiality as to a
client's whereabouts in virtually every conceivable situation in which
it becomes an issue.
What happens if a court rejects the lawyer's assertion of the
privilege and directs him to testify? Under the Code, a lawyer may
reveal client confidences when required by law or court order. 224
Furthermore, the lawyer is directed not to fail to disclose whatever
he is legally required to reveal. 225 The better interpretation of the
215. See generally CODE, supra note 4, Preamble.
216. New York State Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm., Op. 529 (1981).
217. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 155; see
supra notes 192-95 and accompanying text.
218. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 156; see
supra note 193.
219. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 84-
349. The opinions were not withdrawn in response to a specific inquiry on an
ethical issue, but rather, as part of a general review of ABA opinions which was
conducted after the adoption of the Rules by the ABA House of Delegates in
August, 1983. Id.
220. See supra notes 203-16 and accompanying text.
221. See supra notes 189-95 and accompanying text.
222. See supra note 29, which sets forth the Code definitions of "confidences"
and "secrets."
223. See CODE, supra note 4, EC 4-4.
224. Id. DR 4-101(C)(2).
225. Id. DR 7-102(A)(3). Compare Rule 1.7(b) of the January 1980 discussion
draft of the Rules, which provides that a lawyer must reveal that whicb he is
required by law to reveal. RULES, supra note 4, Rule 1.7(b) (Discussion Draft 1980).
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phrase "required by law or court order" is that it prevents disclosure
unless a final court order, which is not subject to further review,
has been issued. 226 Immediate compliance with an initial court order
may well constitute a dereliction of the attorney's duty to defend
a client zealously. 227 Appeal of the order should be sought even
though the attorney may face contempt charges. 2 1
The New York State Bar Association Ethics Committee concurs
with this point of view. The Committee has asserted that "where
the order is subject to good faith challenge, the lawyer should be
free to postpone giving the court-ordered testimony pending appro-
priate review. ' 229 This position is consistent with the following con-
clusion articulated by the United States Supreme Court: "When a
court during trial orders a witness to reveal information,
[c]ompliance could cause irreparable injury because appellate courts
cannot always 'unring the bell' once the information has been re-
leased. . . . [T]he person to whom such an order is directed has
an alternative [of seeking precompliance review.]" 230
VII. Conclusion
Lawyer-client confidentiality is an essential feature of the American
adversarial system of justice. To be effective, an attorney must be
fully informed of all pertinent facts related to the legal matter. A
free flow of communication between client and lawyer must be
encouraged. On the other hand, it is recognized that in certain
limited circumstances it may be necessary to reveal client confidences
in order to save a human life. It is contended, however, that
permissive disclosure provisions suffice in such a situation.
Lawyers should not commit crimes nor should they assist their
clients in criminal activity. However, vital constitutional rights will
be lost if lawyers become whistleblowers. The final version of the
Rules, particularly Rule 1.6, should be adopted. Limited permissive
disclosure represents a proper balancing of society's needs against
the client's constitutional rights. The delicate lawyer-client relation-
ship requires discretion in the disclosure of client confidences. In
exercising that discretion, lawyers must be trusted to make moral
and ethical decisions.
226. THE AMERICAN LAWYER'S CODE OF CONDUCT Rule 1.3 (Discussion Draft
1981); see also Hodes, supra note 64, at 759-60.
227. See generally Hodes, supra note 64, at 759-60.
228. Id. Hodes asserts that under each of the three ethics codes a case can be
made for mandatory, or at least voluntary, disclosure of a fugitive client's where-
abouts. Id. at 758.
229. New York State Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm., Op. 528 (1981).
230. Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 460-61 (1975).
